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Abstract 
Serious consideration of our students' learning requires us to engage with the theoretical constructs of other 
disciplines, some of which have much to tell us about how we teach law, how we might teach it more 
effectively; how our students learn and what they understand as learning.  This interdisciplinary 
understanding is an essential component in the dialectic between theory and praxis of teaching and 
learning, and the law.  If this is true for what might be termed more traditional learning methods, it is even 
more the case for computer-based educational interventions.  In computer-based learning, the management 
of learning on many levels becomes critical to educational success, and the understanding and application 
of interdisciplinary theory plays an important role in the design and development of materials and in the 
learning events themselves.   
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
More and more within universities there is a call for academics to develop an awareness 
of the educational practice within their discipline.  All the recent major reports on higher 
education make mention of the necessity for disciplines to examine their teaching and 
learning, and to consider how it might be carried out more effectively.  Dearing, Garrick, 
and Booth for instance all point to this reflexive self-awareness as a necessary component 
in the improvement of student learning.  Thus Booth, in his statement of the professional 
values underpinning practice, talked of the importance of ‘a commitment to continued 
reflection and consequent improvements to practice’.1  Later in the report, Booth notes 
that one of the aspects of the HE teacher’s role and expertise that was acknowledged as 
requiring ‘greater emphasis’ was  
[a]n understanding of the relationship between the research and teaching 
processes. The ability to engage in critical enquiry, to interpret, to evaluate, and 
an understanding of how to develop these intellectual abilities in students. Allied 
to this, the need for constant reflection on and effective evaluation of one's own 
teaching methods and practice.2 
                                                
1 Accreditation and Teaching in Higher Education, Final Report, May 1998, para. 2.7 
2 Ibid, ‘Questions for Consultation’, d.3.2.  The link between teaching and research indicated by Booth 
deserves much greater research attention than it has hitherto attracted.  There is evidence which points to 
the effect that an over-emphasis on research activity has upon the quality of attention given by the 
profession to teaching and learning  See for example J. Court, Opportunity Blocks : A Survey of 
Appointments and Promotion in UK Higher  Education, London, AUT, 1998 and L. Elton, ‘Effect of 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1817689
 2 
 
Such reflection inevitably leads us to consider the wider view beyond our individual 
disciplines.  As anyone who has asked students to undertake reflective analysis knows, 
self-reflection inevitably involves an awareness of context, both social and intellectual, 
and is a product of the interaction of both.3  This is as true of teaching as it is of learning 
in higher education, discussion of which immediately involves us in two disciplines: 
education and the knowledge domain within which teaching takes place. But this is only 
the start.  Disciplines break down into sub-disciplines, which frequently overlap with 
each other and other disciplinary domains.  Within the cultures and activities of these 
domains, there is a wealth of teaching and learning experience which one can develop in 
one’s own discipline.  John Cowan has highlighted this recently: 
It is a singularly British characteristic to tie staff and curriculum 
development firmly to discipline areas. ... I have often found that good 
teaching approaches which I have encountered in other discipline areas 
can readily be translated into a form suitable for use by me and my 
students -- with less demand on my ingenuity and time than if I had 
needed to invent something from scratch. 4 
 
Interdisciplinary comparison is therefore valuable to the process of reflection on what our 
teaching and our students’ learning activities are, what they achieve and how they can be 
improved.  Indeed, I would argue that, in sub-areas such as IT and Law, it is impossible 
not to be interdisciplinary, and that greater interdisciplinarity is essential to the design 
and implementation of learning materials in cyberspace.  In order to explore this 
argument, I shall take two examples.  First I shall examine the application of aspects of 
the considerable literature of composition and rhetorical theory on legal writing, and 
analyse a practical implementation of this in CBL courseware.  Secondly, I shall analyse 
the use to which Toulmin’s model of argumentation is put in some of the AI literature on 
the teaching and learning of argument skills in law.   
 
 
 
Splicing rhetoric and legal writing into the curriculum: generic issues 
 
The nature of the traditional culture and design of the legal curriculum gives rise to two 
structural and related difficulties for the teaching of writing and argument skills.  The 
first is the well-documented tendency for law teachers to focus on the teaching and 
learning of substantive law, rather than legal skills or the integration of skills and 
knowledge.  The second involves the embedding of argument and writing skills 
throughout the curriculum.  While writing and argument skills can be given priority in 
specific courses, such courses become ‘ghettos’ for skills development unless these skills 
                                                
Funding Council Policies on Teaching Quality’, Research, Teaching and Learning in Higher Education, B. 
Smith and S. Brown, (eds), London, Kogan Page, 1995 pp.40-48 
3 See for example J. Cowan, On Becoming an Innovative University Teacher: Reflection in Action, London, 
Society for Research into Higher Education and Open University Press, 1998, p.18 
4 Ibid, p.121 
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are distributed in teaching, learning and assessment activities throughout the curriculum.  
If there is no distribution, then transfer of learning between predominantly skills-based 
classes and predominantly knowledge-based classes becomes more difficult to achieve, 
because boundaries between skills learning and law learning are actually reinforced by 
the presence of skills-based classes.   
 
In addition to these curricular issues, there are a number of generic issues in the teaching 
and learning of writing and argument itself, which require to be addressed.  These are 
issues which surface in the cognitive literature in the form of apparent dualisms: 
individual v. disciplinary forms of writing and argument; process of writing v. product of 
text and argument; generic theory of argumentation v. specific and discipline-based 
implementations in educational and professional practice.  Any approach to 
argumentation requires to deal with these tensions, and for this reason I shall outline their 
consequences in more detail below.   
 
Individual v disciplinary forms of argument 
Broadly speaking, this concerns the distinction between writing as expression of 
individual voice, and writing as a disciplinary or paradigmatic exercise (the Foucaultian 
echo is deliberate). If students are learning a disciplinary skill, what part does self-
expression play in this?  This question, present in the composition literature for some 
time, was the subject of a dialogue between Peter Elbow and David Bartholomae.5  
Bartholomae emphasised the responsibility of academics within a discipline to explicate 
text forms important within to the contemporary discipline, and to induct students into 
their use within the academy: 
 [i]nside this linguistic present, students (with instruction -- more precisely, 
with lessons in critical reading) can learn to feel and see their position inside 
a text they did not invent and can never, at least completely, control.  Inside a 
practice: linguistic, rhetorical, cultural, historical.6 
Elbow, on the contrary, has a much more informal concept of the purpose of writing.  He 
views the academic essay, for example, as a narrative, which expresses personal point of 
view and is a process of the discovery of self-confidence and personal voice.  It is 
through the development of this, Elbow asserts, that students begin the journey from the 
periphery of a discipline to its centre.   
 
In the dialogue between Elbow and Bartholomae are two fundamentally opposing views 
of how students may be inducted into the argument structures of a discipline, one 
emphasising individuality, self-expression, the discovery of meaning through the 
discovery of voice, while the other talks in terms of the role of the institution, 
paradigmatic models and the formal markers of what constitutes good disciplinary texts.7  
                                                
5 D. Bartholomae ‘Writing with teachers: a conversation with Peter Elbow’ College Composition and 
Communication 46, 62-71, 1995a; Bartholomae, D., et. al. ‘Interchanges: responses to Bartholomae and 
Elbow’ College Composition and Communication 46, 84-107, 1995b 
6 Ibid., Bartholomae, 1995a, p.65 
7 Sharples and Pemberton have characterised these positions as different strategies within the writing 
process: either ‘following a thread’ (writing as discovery) or ‘filling a template’ (writing based on ‘already 
written texts as a guide to planning’).  See M. Sharples, and L. Pemberton, ‘Representing writing: external 
representations and the writing process’, in P. Holt, and N. Williams, (eds), Writing: State of the Art, 
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Bartholomae and Elbow thus represent two established positions within the research 
literature on composition and writing research.  Recently, however, some researchers 
have identified the need to ‘blur the distinction’ between these two quite different 
approaches, so that teaching practice can take account of both positions.8 
 
Within a university setting the same tension of opposites is present.  Individual writers 
must write and carry out private cognitive processes; but they must do so within a 
discourse community, an interpretive community, as Bartholomae, Fish, Bizzell, Charney 
& Carlson and others have pointed out.9  Their work, and the research of many others, 
highlights the extent to which legal genres, both professional and academic, are not 
merely part of socially constructed reality: they are socially constructive of the law and 
lawyers’ professionalism.10  Moreover, the tension between private writing and argument 
and discourse communities is complicated in legal curricula by the presences of two sets 
of discourse genres -- the academic and the professional.  Students require to use, and 
write within, genres of academic writing and reading, but they also need to interact with 
the texts and pragmatic understandings of the professional discourse community, which 
are created by professionals outside the university, but often used within it in the form of 
cases, statutes and practitioner texts.11  The relationship between academic and the 
professional genres of argument, though seldom the subject of overt instruction, thus 
require to be negotiated by students in their learning of legal genres. 
 
Process of writing v text product 
The tension between process and product is another generic issue in the teaching and 
learning of argument and writing.  Scardamalia and Bereiter, for example, have 
highlighted the importance of process-oriented interventions in their differentiation 
between substantive and procedural facilitation in writing.12  Their analysis applies to the 
domain of legal argument: the argumentational skills that students learn in the domain of 
law cannot be developed separately from the process of reading others’ texts, or 
                                                
Oxford, Intellect, 319-36, 1992, 325 
8 M. Lea, ‘Academic literacies and learning in higher education: constructing knowledge through texts and 
experience’, Studies in the Education of Adults, Oct 1998, 30, 2, 156-65, p.157 
9 D. Bartholomae ‘Inventing the university’, in M. Rose, (ed) When a Writer Can’t Write: Studies in 
Writer’s Block and Other Composing Process Problems, New York, Guildford Press, 1985; S. Fish, Doing 
What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989; P. Bizzell, P., ‘Cognition, convention, and certainty: what we need to know 
about writing’, Pre/Text, 3, 213-43, 1992; D. Charney & R. Carlson, ‘Learning to write in a genre: what 
student writers take from model texts’, Research on the Teaching of English, 1995, 29, 1, 88-125 
10 For examples of this social construction see P. Goodrich, Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistics, 
Rhetoric and Legal Analysis, London, Macmillan, 1987; G. Kress, and T. Threadgold, ‘Towards a social 
theory of genre’, Southern Review, 21, 215-43, 1988; C. Bazerman, and J. Paradis, Textual Dynamics and 
the Professions: Historical and Contemporary Writing in Professional Communities, Madison, Wisconsin, 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1991 
11 For discussions of the relationships between academic and professional learning, see for example See for 
example M. Eraut, Developing Professional Knowledge and Competence, London, Falmer Press, 1994; P. 
Birks, ‘The Academic and Practitioner’, Legal Studies, 18, 4, 397-414, 1998, 410-11; P.C. Kissam, 
‘Thinking (by writing) about legal writing’,  Vanderbilt Law Review, 40, 135-73, 1987, 142 
12 M. Scardamalia and C. Bereiter, ‘From conversation to composition: the role of instruction in a 
developmental process’, in Glaser, R., editor, (1986) Advances in Instructional Psychology, vol 2, Hillsdale 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1982, 52 
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producing a text which embodies their own arguments.  Yet while in all undergraduate 
programmes the product of law is examined (legislation, case reports, judgements, 
affidavits and the like), the process by which the linguistic artefacts are produced is 
probably less often presented to students as problematic; and when it is made overt, it is 
so normally as part of a course in legal system, Jurisprudence or critical theory.  Thus 
legal semioticians such as Bernard Jackson deploy in the legal domain cognitive research 
into composition and sociolinguistics as well as the semiotics of legal language; but it is 
probably true to say that his texts rarely if ever find their way into courses on which 
students learn the skills of legal writing and argument.13 
 
There are many reasons why legal writing is not problematized, most of which stem from 
the nature of the culture of legal education and the forms of inquiry and argument it 
privileges.14  In the USA, for example, many authors report the low status of legal writing 
courses.15  But part of the problem lies with the innovations that these courses sometimes 
introduce into the curriculum.  When the focus is moved from culturally traditional 
methods of teaching and learning the product of law to teaching the process of learning 
the discipline of law this may be resisted by staff for whom the research into composition 
and argument is recondite, and viewed as lying beyond the domain of the discipline.   
 
Writing theory: generic rules v specific practices 
If the claims of process and product require to be balanced within the curriculum, there is 
a similar tension between the claims of generic theory in argument and writing, and the 
specific forms of argument and writing perceived by a discourse community as essential 
to its educational and professional contexts. Whether or not generic theories of 
argumentation such as Toulmin’s may provide an adequate description of forms of legal 
argumentation (and we shall examine this in detail later in the paper), it is another matter 
as to whether or not such descriptive tools can support students in their assessment of the 
quality of disciplinary argument, as well as their modelling and recreation of that ‘local 
knowledge’ within the discipline.16  The same may well be true with reference to writing 
-- for example the concept of ‘generic structure potential’,17 or ‘schematic structure’18 -- 
but arguably it is more difficult to assess the pedagogic value of these essentially 
descriptive categories.   
 
All of these issues bear directly on the student experience of learning particular forms of 
                                                
13 B. Jackson, Making Sense in Law: Linguistic, Psychological and Semiotic Perspectives Legal Semiotics 
Monographs, Liverpool: Deborah Charles Publications, 1995 
14 Within the last decade this has been the subject of considerable critique.  See for example M.J. Le Brun 
and R. Johnstone, The Quiet (R)evolution: Improving Student Learning in Law , North Ryde, New South 
Wales, The Law Book Company Limited, 1994; C. Maughan and J. Webb, Lawyering Skills and the Legal 
Process, London, Butterworths, 1995; C. Maughan and J. Webb, (eds) Teaching Lawyers’ Skills, London, 
Butterworths, 1996 
15 For a brief summary of this, see P. Maharg, ‘Contracts: An Introduction to the Skills of Legal Writing 
and Analysis’, <http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/cal/1maharg/default.htm>, 1996 
16 C. Geertz, Local Knowledge New York, Basic Books, 1983 
17 R. Hasan, ‘The structure of a text’, in M.A.K Halliday and R. Hasan (eds), Language, Context and Text: 
Aspects of Language in a Social-Semiotic Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989 
18 J.R. Martin, Factual Writing: Exploring and Challenging Social Reality Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989 
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argument and writing within a professional discipline.  The claim of each item within the 
contrasting pairs above is a valid one, but each item requires to be balanced not only 
within its own dyad, but within the dialogue of other dyads, other issues and many other 
competing claims to priority within the curriculum and within the profession.  In this 
respect, the resolution of each pair involves a consideration of all: if educational 
interventions into argument and writing are to be effective, they require integrative 
strategies which are underpinned by researched and appropriate educational theory, and 
designed for local programmes of study.  The literature of curriculum design and 
cognitive research supports such an approach.19   
 
Contracts: A case study in interdisciplinary IT 
 
We can see one attempt to resolve the competing demands of the dyads outlined above in 
a legal writing program, Contracts, which was based on interdisciplinary research in 
rhetoric, law and CAL.20  Based on earlier work carried out with literature students, it 
seemed possible that support for the writing and problem-solving process could be 
offered to students through the medium of hypertext tutorials.21   
 
I began to sketch out a series of tutorials based on the models of writing research 
proposed by Flower and Hayes, and as amended by Scardamalia, Bereiter, Sharples and 
others, and designed specifically for the needs of first year law students studying 
Obligations at Glasgow University.  Two problems presented themselves from the start.  
The first was rhetorical, and faced by most writing instructors, namely the paradox 
created by adopting the Flower and Hayes models: if writing is not a prescriptive stage 
process (think > plan > write), but a matter of, inter alia, juggling constraints, how may 
we teach writing skills successfully?  If we take a linear path through writing activities 
such as note-taking, planning, first drafts, revisions, final drafts, then this would 
emphasise the stage model which Flower and Hayes have argued against in their 
research.  But if we are to give guidance in writing skills, there must be some order, taxis, 
imposed upon the writing process, which, with its intractable simultaneity of mental 
processes, is highly resistant to analysis.  This paradox can never really be solved by 
writing teachers, but hypertext software does significantly reduce the problem.  Students 
could be given the freedom to explore the program in any order: if they wanted to work 
on revision strategies, for instance, they could do so without working through sessions on 
planning or first drafts.  Similarly, they needn't complete all the activities within a tutorial 
or session, only those they felt were relevant to their needs or necessary to their 
understanding of the strategy. 
 
                                                
19 L. Flower L. and J. Hayes ‘Cognition, context, and theory building.’  College Composition and 
Communication. 40: 282-311, 1989; M. Eraut, op.cit; R. Barnett The Limits of Competence: Knowledge, 
Higher Education, and Society Philadelphia, Society for Research into Higher Education and Open 
University Press, 1994 
20 See Maharg, op.cit 1996 
21 P. Maharg, ‘WriteGuide and ReportGuide: Hypertext Writing Programs’, Proceedings of the STELLA 
Symposium: Computers in Teaching and Research in English University of Glasgow, 1991 
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The second problem was a larger one.  To call what appears on a computer screen a 
'tutorial' is really to use a transferred epithet, for these tutorials could not be 
representations on screen of real tutorials.  In what sense, therefore, were the divisions of 
activities and text on screen tutorials?  The question raised another problem, that of 
defining the identity of real tutorials.  'Tutorial' is a notoriously vague word, and much of 
the activity, which goes on in it, depends on the role taken by the tutor.  Baumgart 
identified six distinct roles adopted by tutors - data input, cognitive engineer, elaborator, 
stage setter, probe and reflexive judge.22  The latter two roles alone, according to 
Baumgart, led to increase in the quality of discussion: 'rather than give answers or 
solutions to questions or problems', the probing tutor tended to redirect these to the 
students, 'often with hints or clues to direct thinking'.  The reflexive judge was 
characterised by 'frequent talk and frequent reacting' where the tutor's evaluations were 
'both supportive and corrective'.23   
 
Now one of the striking features of almost any discussion with students about writing is 
how little time is given over to discussion of the writing process, as opposed to the end 
product, which can frequently be the object of considerable criticism.  This is the result of 
socialisation in teaching and assessment, which directs students’ attention to some 
processes but not others.  If little advice is given to students on how to write better 
essays, reports, assignments, while copious comment is given to the substantive subject 
of the writing then, vis-à-vis writing, tutors probably tend to adopt the roles of data input, 
elaborator or at most, stage setter (eg giving essay specifications, without exploring with 
students how the final product may be achieved).  As a result, discussions with students 
about their writing will tend to be descriptive of process, rather than analytical.  One 
reason for this could be the lack on the students’ part of tools with which to analyse their 
writing strategies and consider alternatives. The tutorials or sessions aimed to give 
students the tools to reflect upon their writing themselves, and to create a supportive 
environment where students could contrast their own with an expert legal essay and each 
other’s drafts.   
 
The program aimed to create an exploratory learning environment, therefore, in which 
students could learn about writing processes and practise alternative strategies.  The 
program would thus mimic as far as possible the writing tutorial, in which a piece of 
writing is analysed and discussed, and students put into practice in small-scale activities 
the metacognitive skills discussed in the tutorial.  But if this were to be the case, it would 
be impossible for the computer to analyse the students' writing, as would a tutor.  The 
role of computer as reflexive judge would seem to be automatically eliminated as a role 
model.  At first glance this would appear to be a severe shortcoming of the program.  
Interactivity - Baumgart's 'frequent talk and frequent reacting' - has come to be seen as 
the benchmark of innovative software, and is frequently approved as the ideal role a 
computer can play - interactive writing assistants, partners, workbenches, environments 
(there are many such metaphors, but all stress interactivity) are typical examples.   
                                                
22 N.L. Baumgart, ‘Verbal Interaction in University Tutorials’, Higher Education, 5, 301-317, 1976.  For an 
example of this type of analysis in a medical setting, see M.L. Thomas, D. Snadden & S. Carlisle, ‘”When 
the talking starts”: a framework for analysing tutorials’, Medical Education, 1998, 32, 502-06 
23 Ibid., 312-13 
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Yet it may be that the role of computer as reflexive judge is a flawed metaphor.  The 
basis of the reflexive judge role, as of all tutor roles, is based on entirely open 
communication, and on premise that, however limited the communication may be in 
practice, the opportunity exists for the tutorial's discussion to be open-ended.  Interactive 
software may appear to be a tutor, but it cannot, for the moment at least, match the real 
tutor for flexibility of response, depth of expertise, sensitivity of response to the physical 
presence of a student, and perception of the links between a student's personality and 
his/her work. In the end, Baumgart's 'frequent talk and frequent reacting' is not sufficient: 
there has to be more sophistication of response.  After all, quality interaction is concerned 
less with quantity, and more with showing students how they might use strategies to 
become more perceptive self-critics.  In this sense, a virtual tutorial could be acceptable 
as one of a range of heuristics, which could be created to support student writing.  
Nowhere is this more important than in the area of writing skills, which is pre-eminently 
a practical activity.  No one ever learned writing as a direct result of being taught it; they 
learned through their interpretive experience of praxis and because they wrote within a 
discourse community whose rules they learned through reading, modelling templates, 
finding a voice, and through the comment and criticism of others.   
 
But before I considered a computer program there were a number of considerations to 
balance, most of them interdisciplinary, and more or less summed up by two questions: 
1. why might a computer be a more efficient medium than paper for this learning 
tool? 
2. how would the computer environment affect the learning objectives and structure of 
my text?   
These questions were fairly fundamental and required more than an acknowledgement of 
their existence, and an awareness of possible answers to them before attempting to design 
an electronic learning environment.   
 
The first one was the most difficult to answer, in part because it is impossible, in advance 
of the system being constructed, to say what students would have wanted from it.  The 
number of variables affecting the answer are considerable, too - form of text, domain 
knowledge of the text and the knowledge structure implicit in it, task analyses 
storyboarding, models of students' prior learning, and so on.  The research literature can 
only give guidance and analogies here, not a complete answer.  Nevertheless, this body of 
research was invaluable, for it discussed models and exemplars of hypertext 
representation which could be adapted to the specific remit I had.  Nielsen, for example, 
asked a group of computer science students to state their preferences, whether online or 
in printed format, for reading three types of text: computer manuals, student textbooks 
and fiction.24  The online preference was sub-divided into one with user annotations, in 
the form of hypertext, and plain online text without such annotation facilities.  The results 
showed that, given the user annotation facility, students approved of online manuals, 
viewed textbooks as having small disadvantages online, and much preferred their fiction 
printed.  Regarding the two types of online forms - with or without user annotation 
                                                
24 J. Neilsen, 'Online documentation and reader annotation', in Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Work 
with Display Units, 526-9, Stockholm, Sweden, 1986 
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facilities - students viewed annotation a considerable advantage for online textbooks, a 
small advantage for online manuals and no advantage for their online fiction. 
 
At first glance these results are not a resounding affirmative in favour of an online 
writing program.  But again, if one analyses the context of the questionnaire, the results 
become more equivocal.  The nature of the text, the human-computer interfaces and the 
model of the user have bearing on the result.  For example, what sort of textbook are we 
talking about here?  As linguistics research has shown for some time now, texts which 
appear to have an apparently linear structure often have rich relational structures and 
adjacencies.25  How was the electronic textbook presented on-screen?  How were the 
hypertext links designed?  Was the user engrossed by the progam, and was it pleasurable 
to use?  What was the user expected to be able to do at the start of the program? at the 
end? and so on.  As Nielsen has pointed out, 'users are not necessarily good designers'.  
What the literature did point to, though was the conclusion, controversial in some articles, 
but increasingly accepted by a range of theorists and practitioners, that ‘hypermedia 
systems should be viewed not principally as teaching tools, but rather as learning tools’.26 
 
If the first of the two questions listed above was unanswerable until the program was 
constructed, the second bore directly on the construction of the program, and required 
very definite answers.  But here as everywhere in the field of hypermedia, nothing can be 
taken for granted.  Every assumption must be examined to ensure its fit to the immediate 
context of learning.  In particular, the advice given by most people who have worked 
with hypertext, namely that structuring the hypertext before constructing it is essential, 
turned out to be a more complex issue than it appeared.  At first glance the advice seemed 
eminently practical.  As George Landow pointed out, ‘hypertext's intrinsic open-
endedness removes both the need to create some final universalizing  approach to 
arranging data or event the possibility that one can do so at all’.27  However, to take 
                                                
25 See, for example, D. Schiffrin, Approaches to Discourse, Oxford, Blackwell, 1994; and Robert de 
Beaugrande, Text, Discourse and Process: Towards a Multidisciplinary Science of Texts  Norwood, NJ: 
Ablex, 1980 
26 P.C. Duchastel, ‘Discussion: Formal and Informal Learning with Hypertext’, Designing Hypermedia for 
Learning, Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Designing Hypertext/Hypermedia 
for Learning, Rottenburg/Neckar, FRG, July 1989, D.H. Jonassen and H. Mandl (eds),Berlin, Springer-
Verlag, 135-43, 1989.  In the same volume, Mayes, Kibby and Anderson, quoting Frisse, raised the 
interesting issue of conceptual design, of hypertext and its effect on the user:  
Frisse has discussed how the way in which a hypertext system is conceptualized affects its design.  
If a hypertext node is seen as relatively autonomous then retrieving its information will involve the 
'small-document' approach.  If on the other hand the semantic links between nodes are emphasised 
then retrieving information will be seen as similar to traversing a directed graph.  The small-
document approach emphasises pattern matching; the graph-traversal approach emphasizes 
browsing.   
T. Mayes, M. Kibby and T. Anderson, 'Learning About Learning from Hypertext', ibid, pp.231-2, quoting 
M.D. Frisse, 'Searching for information in a hypertext medical handbook',  Hypertext '87, eds J.B. Smith, F. 
Halasz, N. Yankelovich, M. Schwartz, and F. Weiss, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1987, 
pp.175-188. 
27 G. Landow, ‘Popular Fallacies About Hypertext’, Designing Hypermedia for Learning, Proceedings of 
the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Designing Hypertext/Hypermedia for Learning, 
Rottenburg/Neckar, FRG, July 1989, D.H. Jonassen and H. Mandl (eds),Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 135-43, 
1989, 46 
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Landow's observation a step further, it is easy to create a structure in advance of 
implementation, but extremely difficult to foresee how each node of the hypertext will 
affect every other node.  One can really only appreciate the effect of moving from node 
to node through the hypertext by actually constructing it and doing it one's self.  
Storyboarding and preview overmaps can only give a restricted sense of a reader's 
experience of the text and the relationship between one textual node and another, both in 
the navigational and rhetorical senses.  Perhaps the nearest analogy one can draw is 
between the design of a building by an architect, and its actual construction.  The first is 
an indispensable tool for architects, surveyors, builders, and for the communication of 
technical data to others; but it can hardly be said to give the end-user of the building the 
experience of walking through and living in the constructed and finished spaces.   
 
The construction of the program therefore required constant and interdisciplinary 
attention to be given to the educational aims, the research literature in rhetoric, law and 
HCI, and in local solutions based upon a profile of the typical user, the type and structure 
of information.  Thus as far as the rhetorical research was concerned, generic rules of 
writing were embedded and adapted to specific practices of legal argumentation, not 
merely in the area of Scots law, but in Scots legal argumentation as it was taught in the 
context of the Obligations course at Glasgow University.  Writing products were broken 
down into hypertext units to illustrate process, and to focus students’ attention on their 
own writing procedures.  The program communicated the rules by which writing 
products were judged by examiners, and demonstrated how these rules operated in 
practice.  It illustrated and encouraged personal voice and paradigm forms of argument, 
as the following samples from the qualitative feedback we obtained from students shows:  
 
[Contracts] helped me structure my work.  Helped illustrate the level of detail 
expected and how to present a full, balance answer. 
 
Gave me a better knowledge of how to write or improve an essay in Contracts, ie 
the logical progression through a law problem-type essay.   
 
Writing skills advice – brilliant – no training given on how to write a law essay so 
this is very helpful.  Sample essays and commentaries are also very useful.28 
 
In this example, interdisciplinary research into HCI, rhetoric, legal analysis, and 
compositional studies was called upon in the creation of the program.  Indeed, integration 
of models and approaches from these domains within the program was essential to its 
implementation.29  Such integration, I would argue, is essential also to other cross-
disciplinary initiatives involving law and IT, particularly in the field of AI.   
 
                                                
28 Feedback obtained from students in action research to determine the effectiveness of the program, 
conducted at Glasgow University in 1994 
29 For other examples of such interdisciplinary research, see P. Maharg, ‘(Re)-telling stories: narrative 
theory and the practice of client counselling’, The Law Teacher, 1996, 30, 3, 295-314; K. Barton, P. 
McKellar & P.Maharg, ‘Learning from learning: the dialogue of virtual and real courts’ at 
http://www.bileta.ac.uk/98papers/barton.html 
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Toulmin and Argument: Process and Product 
 
Recently, there has been an increasing interest in the extent to which logical models of 
argument can be employed in the modelling, teaching and learning of legal 
argumentation using IT.30  These encompass computational dialectics,31 dialectical 
models of argumentation,32 legal knowledge based systems (LKBS),33 and case-based 
reasoning.34   
 
Most of these approaches support Gordon’s claim that ‘models of this kind have 
enormous practical and theoretical utility’, not only for the AI community but for jurists 
as well.  Gordon went on to describe in general terms the ‘purpose, object and claims’ of 
a model, then went on to make an important statement regarding them: 
Talking about the purpose, object and claims of the model is somewhat 
misleading, as these are not inherent properties of the model, but are better 
understood as a relationship between an agent and the model.  Thus, when I 
speak of the purpose of a model, I really mean the purpose intended by some 
user of the model.35   
Gordon goes to the heart of the issue here.  A model is simply a representation of 
information in a specific structure, and claims for the model’s effectiveness qua model 
can only arise from its use by particular agents in specific social or disciplinary 
circumstances.  Indeed, unless the model is used or projected into an actual and useable 
environment, any description of its operation within the real world must be constrained 
                                                
30 A.R. Lodder and B. Verheij, ‘Opportunities of Computer-Mediated legal Argumentation in Education’, 
12th Annual BILETA Conference, 'The Future of Legal Education and Practice', 
<http://www.bileta.ac.uk/>, 1997; J. Hage, Reasoning with Rules: An Essay on Legal Reasoning  and Its 
Underlying Logic, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1997; H. Prakken, Logical Tools for Modelling 
Legal Argument: A Study of Defeasible Reasoning in Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1997; 
H. Prakken and G. Sartor, ‘A Dialectical Model of Assessing in Conflicting Arguments in Legal 
Reasoning’ Artificial Intelligence and Law, vol 4, pp.331-368, 1996 
31 R. Kowalski and R. Toni, ‘Abstract Argumentation’ Artificial Intelligence and law, vol 4, pp.275-96, 
1996; A.R. Lodder, and A. Herczog, ‘DiaLaw – A Dialogical Framework for Modeling Legal Reasoning’, 
Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, ACM, Boston, 
pp.146-155, 1995 
32 K.L. Branting, K.L., ‘A Computational Model of Ratio Decidendi’ Artificial Intelligence and Law, vol 2, 
pp.1-31, 1994; A.M. Farley and K. Freeman, ‘Burden of Proof in Legal Argumentation’, Proceedings of 
the Fifth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, Boston, ACM Press, pp.156-64, 1995 
33 T.J.M. Bench-Capon, & F.P. Coenen, ‘Isomorphism and Legal Knowledge Based Systems’ Artificial 
Intelligence and Law, vol 1, pp.65-86, 1992; T.J.M. Bench-Capon, ‘Legal Theory and Legal KBS – A 
Computer Scientist’s Perspective’ JURIX 1994, <http://jurix.bsk.utwente.nl/html/j94.htm>; C. Groendijk 
and M. Tragter, ‘Statistical and Neural Approaches to Smart-Money Determination’, JURIX 1995, 
<http://jurix.bsk.utwente.nl/html/j95.html> 
34 V. Aleven, & K.D. Ashley ‘Evaluating a Learning Environment for Case-Based Argumentation Skills’, 
Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, Boston, ACM Press, 
1997, pp.170-79 
35 T.F. Gordon, The Pleadings Game – An Artificial Intelligence Model of Procedural Justice, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1995, 20 
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by this lack of context.  Gordon is thus right to propose for AI the role of ‘modelling, not 
constructing, intelligence’.  In doing so, he points to the interface between model and the 
world which is always implied when one talks of models and which cannot be elided by 
the model’s designer.   
 
Gordon’s view is given support by Paliwala who, in his keynote address to the 1997 
JURIX conference, observed that many of the unresolved issues surrounding AI and law 
can be best approached by ‘a return to a cybernetic systems theory’.36  In particular, he 
argued, ‘the relationship between the producers and the users needs to be 
reconceptualised through micro-analysis and anthropological observation’.37  Where 
Gordon comments upon the relationship between agent and model, Paliwala highlights 
the relationship between producers or designers and the user.  Both are, in different ways, 
raising issues of intentionality and contextuality, while Paliwala quite deliberately sets 
these within an interdisciplinary context.   
 
The importance of these two issues to the relationship of law and AI can be seen if we 
consider in more detail the use of a model by AI theorists, namely the Toulmin Dialogue 
Game (TDG), as developed by Bench-Capon and others.  As Bench-Capon points out, 
this schema derives from the distinctively European development of interest in argument-
based, non-monotonic approaches to legal reasoning, and from the interest within this 
tradition in Stephen Toulmin’s argument schema.38  The use and in some cases adaptation 
of Toulmin’s work is at first glance a curious common denominator in these schema and 
implementations.  Bench-Capon, however, gives a good account of its attractiveness for 
AI research in the rule-based tradition:39 it is a flexible and global model of argument 
procedure which, while rule-based, can accommodate qualification and rebuttal. As he 
states,  
the point of the TDG is not so much to enforce logically correct behaviour as 
to ensure that the final argument, which emerges from the dialogue, has the 
structure prescribed by Toulmin.  The result is a game with more varied 
moves which we believe, and hope to show, enables a more faithful 
modelling of the kinds of dialogues found in everyday discourse.  Moreover, 
these additional elements are considered important for representing legal 
arguments.40   
                                                
36 A. Paliwala,‘An Intellectual Celebration: 10 Years of JURIX Conferences’, JURIX 1997a, 
<http://jurix.bsk.utwente.nl/papers_pdf/j97-pdf/paliwala.pdf>, 4 
37 Ibid. 
38 See S. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958.  Bench-Capon 
cites examples of other uses of Toulmin’s argument structures: C.C. Marshall, ‘Representing the Structure 
of a Legal Argument’ Proceedings of the Second International Conference on AI and Law, Vancouver, 
ACM Press, 121-127, 1989; L.S. Lutomski, ‘The Design of an Attorney’s statistical Consultant’ 
Proceedings of the Second International Conference on AI and Law, Vancouver, ACM Press, 224-33, 
1989; G. Storrs, ‘The Policy System’, Knowledge Based Systems and Legal Applications, T.J.M. Bench-
Capon (ed) London, Academic Press, 165-82, 1991; J. Zeleznikow and A. Stranieri, ‘The Split-up System: 
Integrating Neural Nets and Rule Based Reasoning in the Legal Domain’, Proceedings of the Fifth JURIX 
International Conference on AI and Law, 185-94, 1995.  See T.J.M. Bench-Capon, ‘Argument in Artificial 
Intelligence and Law’, JURIX 1995, <http://jurix.bsk.utwente.nl/html/j95.html>, 8. 
39 See Bench-Capon 1995, 9 
40 T.J.M. Bench-Capon, ‘Specification and Implementation of Toulmin Dialogue Game’, JURIX 1998, 
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Toulmin would thus seem to provide Bench-Capon and others with an instrument, which 
can organise argument and generate the type of legal defeasibility acceptable to lawyers, 
logicians and the AI community -- the three audiences addressed by Bench-Capon and 
his peers.   
 
However, there are two assumptions made by the above description of the TDG.  First 
there is the presumption that Toulmin’s structures as amended by Bench-Capon model (in 
Gordon’s sense) the reality of legal argumentation.  Secondly (and in spite of Bench-
Capon’s emphasis on the co-operative nature of the game) there is curiously little agency, 
intentionality or context in this description.  Who is the game for, and who will play it?  
In which social or legal context will it be used?  If social context is essential to law’s 
performative nature, which context and which audience are envisaged?  These are 
important criteria, which affect a user’s manipulation of the model in legal practice.  
Hart, for instance, concluded from his research into use of Toulmin’s model that ‘the 
amount of commonality a speaker perceives [with the audience] will affect the claims he 
makes, the data he offers, and the warrants he provides’.41  He also discovered 
‘pronounced differences in the numbers of warrants explicitly supplied by speakers 
facing committed audiences and those facing collective distrust or disagreement’.42   
 
It might be argued in response to this that Hart’s analyses of Toulmin in action actually 
serve to reinforce the model’s application to law, for they prove its usefulness as a 
flexible description of the varieties of legal argument which, given sophisticated 
interfaces, could easily match audience and user expectation.  This is undeniable; but so 
too is the point that there is much more to legal argumentation than a reduction of it to a 
set of formal characteristics.  Toulmin may have given us a generic description of 
argument, which can be applied to the product of legal argumentation; but does it 
describe the process by which expert lawyers dispute?43  Moreover, despite its promise of 
apparent dialogism, there is arguably little room in the Toulmin model for the rhetoric of 
law as enacted in documents or in courts.  There are many examples from sociolegal 
literature we can take to illustrate the point.  Commentators, for example, have argued the 
importance of the complexities of gender differences and relational contexts in legal 
discourse.44  If we were to look for a meta-description of the approach taken by these 
                                                
<http://jurix.bsk.utwente.nl/html/j98.html>, 1.   
41 R.P. Hart, ‘On Applying Toulmin: The Analysis of Practical Discourse’, Explorations in Rhetorical 
Criticism, G.P. Mohrmann, S.J. Stewart and D. Ochs (eds)., University Park, Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 75-95, 1973, 83 
42 Ibid., p.84.  These passages are cited in R. Fulkerson, ‘The Toulmin Model of Argument and the 
Teaching of Composition’, Argument Revisited: Argument Redefined.  Negotiation Meaning in the 
Composition Classroom, B. Emmel, P. Resch and D. Tenney (eds), Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage Publications 
45-72, 1996, 69 
43 Fulkerson raised the same point when he stated that ‘Toulmin’s model has been found useful as an 
analytical tool but problematic as a means of generating arguments, and the gulf between describing 
finished texts and teaching students to produce them is wide.’ Ibid., 51 
44 H. Giles, and N. Coupland, Language: Contexts and Consequences, Pacific Grove, California: 
Brooks/Cole Publishing Co, 1991; J.M. Conley, John M. and W.M. O’Barr, Just Words: Law, Language, 
and Power, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998; H. Jacob, ‘The Elusive Shadow of the Law’, 26 
Law and Society Review 565-90, 1992; S.E. Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness 
Among Working Class Americans, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990 
 14 
rhetorical initiatives, we might find it in James Boyd White’s comprehensive description 
of law’s performative nature.  For him, law is always culture specific; and its rhetoric 
constitutive of the language and formal tropes it employs’. 45  Its rhetoric is also 
constitutive of identities:  
[t]his means that the rhetorician – that is, each of us when we speak to persuade or 
to establish community in other ways – must accept the couble fact that there are 
real and important differences between cultures and that one is in substantial part 
the product of one’s own culture.  The rhetorician, like the lawyer, is thus 
engaged in a process of meaning-making and community-building of which he or 
she is in part the subject.46   
The ability of such argument to create and define a professional group and its practice is 
critical to the nature of legal argument.  Indeed it is central to law’s portrayal of itself as a 
discipline with a formal existence in that it covers its rhetorical tracks so as to establish 
its presence in the domains of logic, objectivity, and reason.47   
 
If we consider Toulmin’s model in the light of White’s characterisation of law as 
rhetoric, the two representations of law would appear to be antithetical.  Toulmin’s model 
is designed to transcend local practices; cultural resources specificities are difficult to 
categorise in the model; the relations between identity, ethics and language lie outwith 
the model altogether.  The model was in fact designed to be descriptive only, and 
descriptive of the structure of argument, as we shall see below.  For this reason alone, it is 
highly doubtful whether its structure of claim, data, warrant, backing can encompass the 
rhetorical nature of law in practice.48   
 
Whether Toulmin’s model can be used effectively in education is another matter.  It is 
interesting that Bench-Capon advocates its usefulness in the teaching and learning of 
legal argument, stating that ‘Toulmin’s schema provides a particularly promising starting 
point for us, since it is widely used on courses, which teach argument skills’.49  Once 
again, we require to take an interdisciplinary perspective on this statement.  The model 
has indeed been widely used, in both courses and texts, but its usefulness is the subject of 
considerable debate.   
 
The claims for the use of the Toulmin model within education have been examined by a 
number of commentators.  One of the more recent and least partisan has been Fulkerson, 
who surveys the use of Toulmin’s model and its educational effectiveness within 
                                                
45 ‘Law as Rhetoric’, p.690  GET FULL REFERENCE  
46 James Boyd White, Heracles’ Bow, Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1985, pp.39-40 
47 See for example, S. Fish, op.cit.  It is interesting to note that White’s view is paralleled in some respects 
by some of the contemporary literature on compositional skills.  Lea and Street for instance, have 
categorised what they call the ‘Academic Literacies’ approach to writing, where literacy is defined not as 
student deficit, or study skills or acculturation into academic discourse, but as ‘social practices at the level 
of epistemology and identity’.  See M. Lea and B. Street, ‘Student writing in higher education: an academic 
literacies approach’, Studies in Higher Education, June 1998, 83 
48 It is interesting to note that Toulmin’s book provoked hostility in his philosophical circle, for it was held 
that he had relinquished the strait path of formal logic for ‘antilogic’.  See Fulkerson 1996, op.cit., 45-6. 
49 T.J.M. Bench-Capon, ‘A Computer Supported Environment for the Teaching of Legal Argument’, 13th 
annual BILETA Conference, ‘The Changing Jurisdiction’, 1998, 2 
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classrooms (predominantly in composition and argument classes: he does not deal with 
AI uses of the model). As Fulkerson points out, Toulmin’s model was adopted quite early 
after its initial publication in the UK, in American schools as a new approach to argument 
in the context of composition and rhetoric. Toulmin himself noted the irony of this: 
More than thirty years ago, when I sat down to write my book, The Uses of 
Argument, the last thing I had in mind was to revive the theory of rhetoric.  
My own concern with ‘substantive inferences’ sprang directly from my 
dissatisfaction with the current state of the theory of knowledge, and my 
target was other philosophers ...  Only when I came to understand the reason 
why the American speech communication and forensic communities took the 
book so seriously could I even (so to say) grasp the significance of my own 
work!50  
 
But if the model now has acquired a lineage in the history of philosophy and rhetoric, 
Fulkerson is right when he remarks that it is no longer canonical within the rhetorical 
tradition: [it] is becoming more, not less, controversial, albeit on different terms than 
those of philosophy’s debate within it’.51  Commenting on the results of the research on 
Toulmin as well as his own experience of using it to teach argument, he notes four 
problems in applying Toulmin to major argument structures: 
1. use of the model in the classroom requires ‘extensive analysis, patience and a lot 
of practice’ 
2. application of the model at discourse level is ‘not a routine or algorithmic 
procedure in which various analysts would produce the same layout’ 
3. the model ‘fails to assist in making value judgements’ regarding the quality of 
argument within a discipline or professional domain.  (This criticism is one with 
which Toulmin may well agree, since he has elsewhere described the quality of 
argument as being essentially field-dependent.   
4. some ‘traditional principles of argument evaluation’ are not accounted for by 
Toulmin’s model52 
Fulkerson goes on to summarise research into use of Toulmin within a variety of 
domains, citing van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Kruiger, and Hart, amongst others.53  
According to him, it is by no means clear that the Toulmin model brings significant 
benefits to the teaching and learning of argumentation: at present we have a ‘good deal of 
lore about the Toulmin model’, together with ‘theorising and philosophising.  What we 
                                                
50 Cited in Fulkerson, 1996 op.cit., 46.  See also R. Fulkerson, ‘Some Uses and Limitations of the Toulmin 
Method of Argumentation’, The Toulmin Method: Exploration and Controversy, Arlington, TX: Liberal 
Arts, 80-95, 1991.  The cross-over from one discipline to another implied in Toulmin’s statement here is a 
classic instance of interdisciplinary research and appropriation.  Paul Ricoeur describes it well: ‘To 
understand an author better than he understood himself is to unfold the revelatory power implicit in his 
discourse, beyond the limited horizon of his own existential discourse’.  P. Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the 
Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation, edited, translated by John B. Thompson, 
Cambridge University Press, 1981, 191 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., 55-6; 48 
53 F.H. van Eemeren,. R. Grootendorst, T. Kruiger, ‘Toulmin’s Analysis Model’, Handbook of 
Argumentation Theory: A Critical Survey of Classical Backgrounds and Modern Studies, Dordrecht, 
Holland/Providence, RI, Foris, 162-207, 1987; Hart, op.cit.  See also A.H. Fairbanks, ‘The Pedagogical 
Failure of Toulmin’s Logic’ The Writing Instructor 12 (Spring/Summer) 103-14, 1993 
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need is further careful research (including experiments, ethnographies, and case 
studies)’.54  Much the same could be said of a more recent article by Chinn and Anderson 
which attempts to use an amended Toulmin model to stimulate interactive reasoning in 
collaborative reasoning discussions.55  The article presents much theory about Toulmin 
and argumentation in the classroom, but offers little research evidence, either qualitative 
or quantitative, that such use of the model stimulates more effective formation of 
argument among students. 
 
Fulkerson is talking here about the use of Toulmin in the domain of composition 
research, but the same could probably be said for AI adaptations of Toulmin, too. The 
same four problems that Fulkerson raises concerning the use of Toulmin in composition 
classes could be said to be applicable to AI adaptations. As Fulkerson points out, this 
research is crucial, for Toulmin’s original model was not designed as a classroom 
heuristic: the model is descriptive, not generative, of argument.  Indeed Toulmin himself 
took a remarkably situationist approach to the learning of argument, commenting that it is 
learned through apprenticeship in specific fields.56   
 
In many respects the reception of Toulmin by other disciplines is a cautionary tale for 
interdisciplinary studies.  It is interesting that of the problems identified with Toulmin’s 
model above, only number four is a criticism of Toulmin per se.  The other points deal 
with the ways the model was used by others in their own fields.  What it reveals is the 
extent to which the catenation of ideas by which knowledge proceeds in any specific 
discipline require to be carefully examined before one of the concepts is prised out and 
used for other purposes.  It is by no means certain that the seductive simplicity of 
Toulmin’s model in its descriptive context transfers easily, if it does at all, to other more 
applied and generative contexts.   
 
At this point, the reader might be forgiven for thinking that in issuing such a caution, I 
am arguing against interdisciplinary practice.  On the contrary: it is only by a more 
thoroughgoing interest in disciplinary practices and arguments that we can use 
interdisciplinary endeavour to enrich our own domain.  This has been recognised for 
some time in other disciplines, and often surfaces at times when disciplines question the 
nature of their own identity. In education, for example, there was one such thread of 
debate in the late sixties in the US.  Joseph Schwab argued against the wholesale 
importation of theories into the practice of education and the use of concepts derived 
from them as principles of learning.57  Yet he also acknowledged the synthetic nature of 
education as a discipline, and consequently took the view that no single theory would 
ever supply an adequate basis for educational practice.  Instead, he advocated what he 
termed ‘polyfocal conspectus’ -- an interdisciplinary merging of theory from multiple 
                                                
54 Op.cit, 68 
55 C.A. Chinn and R. D. Anderson, ‘The Structure of Discussions Intended to Promote Reasoning’, 
Teachers College Record, 100, 2, 315-68, 1998 
56 S. Toulmin, ‘Logic and the Criticism of Arguments’, The Rhetoric of Western Thought, fourth edition, 
J.L. Golden, G.F. Berquist, W. Coleman, (eds), Dubuque, IA, Kendall/Hunt, 374-88, 1989, 378, cited in 
Fulkerson, 1996, op.cit., 63 
57 J.J. Schwab, The Practical: A Language for Curriculum Washington DC, National Educational 
Association, 1970 
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sources with the grounding experience of teachers and learners.  Paliwala has argued for 
something similar in the relationship between AI and law: ‘AI work is better conceived in 
terms of a cybernetic partnership between computers and human programmers, domain 
experts and users’.58  Nor is this notion foreign to law.  Jurisprudence, perhaps the most 
synthetic of law’s domains, has undergone its postmodern crises; and legal education, 
what we might call an emerging sub-domain with all the growing pains that that entails, 
is a highly porous region, drawing upon psychology, education, and many other areas of 
knowledge.  
 
It is in this respect that the title of this paper is significant.  Normally, the use of one 
disciplinary concept in another discipline is accompanied by metaphors of borrowing, 
taking, displacement; of borders, boundaries and maps.59  Interdisciplinary researchers 
‘cross’ such borders, have a ‘home’ discipline, ‘borrow’ concepts in other domains, and 
the like.  The Scots word ‘reiving’, in many of its meanings, expresses this well: the 
sense of raiding across borders, carrying off, the violent intrusion into other communities.  
But there is another sense of the word, which makes it profoundly descriptive of the 
nexus of law, legal education, IT, AI, compositional studies, rhetoric and the other 
disciplines cited in this paper.  In the late sixteenth century, the word came to have the 
meaning of ‘to rescue … by carrying off’ (my emphasis).60  Law’s use of IT in legal 
practice and education requires us to rescue concepts which have become possessed by 
other disciplines, other tribes within the recent history of university specialisation, but 
which were really always part of law’s project.  Law needs to re-acquire the sense of the 
rhetorical, and of social context in IT use; and an awareness of the necessity of 
interpreting relevant lines of research in disciplines adjacent to its own concerns.  On p.5 
above I argued that educational interventions into argument and writing require 
integrative strategies underpinned by researched and appropriate educational theory 
(perhaps I should have written ‘appropriated’ theory). I would argue that the same applies 
to AI models of argumentation, which would surely become more robust if both lawyers 
and AI practitioners in this field considered not only the social context of their models, 
but also the rhetorical and educational research applicable to their models.   
 
                                                
58 A. Paliwala, ‘Artificial Blue and Deep Intelligence’, <http://jurix.bsk.utwente.nl/papers_pdf/j97-pdf/j97-
8.pdf>, 1997, 104 
59 See G. Squires, ‘Interdisciplinarity in Higher Education in the United Kingdom’, European Journal of 
Education, 27, 201-9, 1992; Tony Becher, (1989) Academic Tribes and Territories, Milton Keynes, Open 
University Press, 1989; Tony Becher, ‘The Significance of Disciplinary Differences’ Studies in Higher 
Education, 19, 151-61, 1994; Tony Becher, ‘The Learning Professions’, Studies in Higher Education, 21, 
43-55, 1996 
60 The Concise Scots Dictionary (1985), editor-in-chief Mairi Robinson, Aberdeen University Press 
